The Effectiveness of the European Court of Justice
Why reluctant states comply
By Diana Panke
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Book Information
- Format: Hardcover
- ISBN: 978-0-7190-8306-8
- Pages: 256
- Publisher: Manchester University Press
- Price: £85.00
- Published Date: October 2010
- BIC Category: POLITICAL SCIENCE / World / European, POLITICAL SCIENCE / Constitutions, Society & social sciences / EU & European institutions, Society & social sciences / Constitution: government & the state, Politics, Politics & government, Constitution: government & the state
Description
The effectiveness of international law depends upon the willingness of states to comply with its provisions. Despite the current move towards binding international law, every international organisation grapples with serious instances of non-compliance. As a reaction, numerous international courts and arbitration bodies have been strengthened in the last two decades. Unlike their domestic counterparts, international courts cannot rely on the monopoly of legitimate force as a last resort for restoring compliance. This raises the question under which conditions international courts are nevertheless able to promote compliance with international norms - even against the initial will of the affected states.
This book looks at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as an example of a court, which can apply judicial discourses, judgments and sanction-threats to cases in which states are reluctant to comply. Overall, the ECJ is very successful in ending norm violations through its compliance-instruments. However, some cases require up to 17 years or even a threat with sanctions until the effectiveness of European law is restored, while others are settled somewhat faster via judgments, or very quickly through judicial discourses. The book shows that issue-specific variables, such as the nature of the issue, its interpretational scope, its fit to domestic ideas, influence whether one of the three compliance instruments successfully induces compliance - even against the strong initial will of member states.
Contents
A) INTRODUCTION
1. Relevance and Research Question
B) THE PUZZLE AND THE ARGUMENT
2. The Puzzle: Non-Compliance and the Varying Success of Compliance Instruments
3. Theorizing the Effectiveness of Compliance Instruments
C) EVIDENCE
4. Effective Judicial Discourses
5. Effective Judgments
6. Effective Sanction-Threats
7. Comparing the UK and Germany
D) CONCLUSIONS
8. Compliance with Law Beyond the Nation-State
Annex
Data Sources for the Dependent Variable
Data Sources for the Independent Variables
Independent Variables of Country-specific Approaches
References
Author
Diana Panke is Lecturer in Politics at University College Dublin