Derek Averre on the fall of the Assad regime, Russian strategy in the Middle East, and why Putin might still find an ally in Syria.
The siege of Aleppo was a crucial juncture in the Syrian civil war and a pivotal event in the Arab Spring: Russia effectively acted as a military ally to the Assad government, providing air support in a meticulously planned operation against the opposition. As Aleppo finally fell in December 2016, leaving Assad still in power in large parts of the country, defence minister Sergei Shoigu boasted that Russia had averted yet another Western-inspired ‘colour revolution’ – anathema to a Russian leadership that privileges sovereign states ruled by strong leaders, reflecting a fixation on its own domestic order – and checked the spread of militant Islamism. Russia’s new-found military presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a strategically vital region, signalled both its ability to defend its national interests and the restoration of its status as a global power in a ‘multipolar’ world order.
Eight years on, the Syrian civil war has suddenly taken a new turn. The surprise advance by Islamist and anti-Assad forces into the capital Damascus, meeting little resistance by government troops, overturned Moscow’s gains in Syria in a matter of days. The rebels, taking advantage of Israel’s campaign against Iranian-backed forces after the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks and the backing of a more assertive Turkey – not to mention the depletion of Russia’s resources in its war with Ukraine – appear to have dealt a decisive blow to Moscow’s regional strategy. With the advent of an untried Islamist government, the Middle East is again mired in uncertainty.
But Russia’s foreign policy has changed markedly over the last decade. Moscow’s relations with Tehran have been strengthened by the latter’s provision of weapons to support Russia’s Ukraine campaign, cementing their shared opposition to interventionist Western policies and imposition of sanctions. Russia and Turkey have a mutual dependence in dealing with regional security, trade and energy issues, despite their differences. Russian business majors have worked hard to forge trade and investment ties with the Gulf Arab states, particularly the UAE. Despite Russia’s official criticism of Israel’s campaign against the Palestinians, the two countries are likely to maintain close contact to manage Middle Eastern flashpoints and avert a regional conflagration. Moreover, Moscow’s concern over a resurgence of militant Islamism in the Middle East – which, given its own history of unrest in the North Caucasus and terrorist attacks in Russian cities, was an important factor in its intervention in Syria – remains on its security agenda.
Another factor is the weakened authority of the US and Europe in the MENA region. Their inconsistent approaches to the Libya, Syria and Yemen conflicts, and to Israel’s ruthless tactics in Gaza, have generated a greater sense of agency among the regional states as they vie for influence in an unstable security environment. Few of these states have joined the Western campaign to marginalise Russia over the Ukraine war. There is added uncertainty over the second Trump administration’s approach to the multiple, complex challenges the Middle East presents. Moscow – now well-versed in transactional, pragmatic dealings with the MENA powers – may well retain a role as an important diplomatic player in the region and a potential counterweight to Western intervention. The stakes are high; the fundamental shift in Russia’s geostrategic and geoeconomic orientation towards non-Western partner countries means that its policies in the Middle East are much more aligned with its global interests.
Early indications are that Russia – diplomatically active in mediating a settlement in the Syrian civil war but continually frustrated by Assad’s intransigence – will try to accommodate the demands of the new Syrian government. Adept at maintaining relations with Islamist groups, both in Syria and elsewhere – notably the Afghan Taleban and the Yemeni Houthis, as well as Hamas – Moscow may well promote the legitimacy of the new administration in establishing stable and inclusive governance. Despite its previous armed opposition to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the main alliance of groups that deposed Assad, Moscow may even help to reconstitute Syria’s military and security forces, providing a hedge against excessive Iranian and Turkish influence – while protecting its own security and trade interests in Syria and the wider region.
These recent events reflect the enduring importance of the Middle East in Russia’s foreign relations. The hardback edition of Russian Strategy in the Middle East and North Africa, published in 2024 with Manchester University Press, analysed fundamental trends in Russia’s thinking and practice, the role of domestic institutions and actors in policymaking, Moscow’s interactions with both regional states and the external powers, its approach to militant Islamism and investment of resources to further its regional strategy. The paperback edition incorporates an extended preface that highlights the tumultuous ongoing processes of regional and global change – including the impact of the Ukraine war and the main recent events in the MENA region – that compel Russia to respond and revise fundamental aspects of its foreign and security policy.
Derek Averre is Honorary Reader at the University of Birmingham and has been a member of CREES (the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies) since 1991.
His book, Russian Strategy in the Middle East and North Africa, is out now.