It is intellectually fashionable to be gloomy about the current state of the political world and about British progressive and social democratic politics more specifically. There are some good grounds for this. The British Labour Party’s electoral defeats since 2010, its profound internal divisions since the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader in 2015, the collapse of the Liberal Democrats, the fragmentation of progressivism in Scotland and, above all, the 2016 referendum vote in favour of ‘Brexit’, are all situated in a broader international context in which social democratic and liberal parties have struggled to maintain traction amidst the rise of (mostly) right-wing populism, manifested most dramatically in the election of Donald Trump to the American presidency. These problems are also rooted in longer historical questions, since the arrival of democracy in Britain in 1918, regarding the persistence of inequalities, the limits of democratisation, and of the cultivation of a sense of active citizenship within the confines of the British state, and the Labour Party’s patchy electoral success in the so-called ‘Conservative century’. This book’s honorand, the political thinker, historian, politician and public intellectual David Marquand, ranks among the most perceptive in drawing attention to many of these challenges, most notably in his acclaimed 1991 book *The Progressive Dilemma* (Marquand, 1992: 24–5).

These challenges are very real, yet the above picture is a partial one. It runs the risks both of conforming to the traditional tendency of many on the left, to focus primarily on the bleaker sides of social and political trends, and of magnifying relatively recent and short-lasting right-wing populist advances...
Making social democrats into something solidified, uniform and even irreversible. It is the contention of this volume that both political history and political present are more complex, multi-sided and essentially mixed than that, and social democrats need not resign themselves either to the inevitability or the endurance of the current state of affairs. As in times past, the constraints upon, and threats to, progress stand alongside achievements and new opportunities. While Labour won fewer elections than the Conservatives in the twentieth century, the extensions of welfare protection, civil liberties, democracy and educational opportunity to which its governments gave effect, most notably in office from 1945, 1964 and 1997, made a lasting impact, and often survived, at least in important measure, through long ensuing periods of Conservative rule. Social democracy’s often diffuse societal, intellectual and cultural influences have exceeded and outlasted Labour’s direct electoral success.

Moreover, even by the narrower electoral measure, it must be remembered that Labour’s fall from power in 2010 came after, by far, its longest sustained period of electoral success. Albeit tentatively, the securing of the French presidency in 2017 by Emmanuel Macron, has suggested scope for a reinvigoration of centrist or centre-left electoral accomplishment, or at least, as also in recent elections in the Netherlands, and in the collapse of UKIP’s vote in the 2017 British general election, the beginnings of a plateau and perhaps a diminution in the populist appeal. Even in the context of Trump’s victory, it is too rarely remembered that the Democratic Party have still had the better of US presidential election results since 1992, and even more so in terms of share of the popular vote – as even in its defeats of 2000, and again in 2016 itself.

Most fundamentally, progressive and social democratic ideas rest on a broadly optimistic, albeit also nuanced and realistic, view of the potential and ultimate capacity for virtue, good sense and flowering of ‘the people’. At the core of a new politics of ‘mutual education’, wrote Marquand in 1988, in his seminal *The Unprincipled Society*, ‘lies the belief that men and women may learn if they are stretched; that they can discover how to govern themselves if they win self-government’ (Marquand, 1988: 246). In many ways, this description goes to the heart of the meaning and the challenge of social democracy, and of progressive politics more broadly. It highlights that real progress, both social and individual advances, must in some profound sense be achieved by the people of a country, not just for them, that the people’s role must be active, not passive. It also indicates that this advancement must ultimately be about more than a material or structural one, an increase in economic well-being or in the efficacy of particular policies or institutions. It must also
encompass an uplift in the culture, values and indeed the very character of the citizenry.

Without this crucial double aspect of popular participation and ethical development, progressivism would both lack the depth of roots and power of momentum to sustain it and fail to provide to individuals that meaningful sense of inner, psychological fulfilment, involvement, and perhaps even happiness without which more economic-orientated or policy-orientated means of furthering progress seem pointless. The inescapable fate of the progressive, as Marquand articulated, is ‘to gamble’ on the ordinary people’s ability to rise to this ambitious, participatory, learning process, and also to insist on this deeper agenda of progress through ethics, citizenship and values, not simply via the easier, more obvious or more tangible routes of ‘manipulative short cuts to change, imposed “reforms”, technocratic fixes’ (Marquand, 1988: 246).

This approach suggests the basis of progressivism is to be found in values, culture and character as much as economics, institutions and structures – though also in the interconnections across all of these. That being so, developments like the rapid expansion of higher education, heightened civil liberties, home ownership and ambitions, not least for women and ethnic minorities, the more rapid, democratic and accessible dissemination of news and information, a seeming growing recent upsurge in grassroots political involvement and even more attentive approach to parenting matter. They may be just as conducive to social and political ‘progress’ as some of the more traditional, and more oft-cited measures of social democratic strength, such as the size of the organised industrial male working class, or the extent of state economic ownership. Moreover, many of these advances have been especially marked since the supposed high-water mark of social democracy (variously dated as 1951, 1970 or 1979). There are thus serious grounds for broadening and complicating narratives of social democratic decline and advance, which presently excessively privilege, and at times romanticise, the pre-1979 past.

With such considerations firmly in mind, this volume focuses less on the economic, institutional or policy issues that have produced much fruitful investigation elsewhere, and more on these questions relating to the popular values, mindsets and sense of citizenship needed to further social democracy, on that deeper enterprise of *Making Social Democrats*. The book also aims to provide an opportunity for its authors and readers to reflect broadly and deeply on the ‘big picture’ of social democracy and progressivism, both historical and contemporary. Encouraging the lifting of sights from the restrictions of either academic specialism or journalistic and political immediacy, contributors were
asked to reflect, as Marquand has done over his long career, on what it is that lies at the ‘heart’ of progressive dilemmas, to consider social democracy over a broad historical and contemporary sweep.

These two aspects give the book both a distinctive unifying focus and an especially kaleidoscopic coverage of social democracy. Relatively few such broad explorations of British social democracy have been undertaken since turn-of-the-century edited collections like that of Tanner, Thane and Tiratsoo (2000). Worley’s compilation (2009) is more recent, but more exclusively focused on the inter-war period, just as Hickson’s (2016) is more specifically concentrated on contemporary social democratic policy and ideas. The most comparable collaborative work on the theme of social democracy is the book *In Search of Social Democracy* (Callaghan et al., 2009), following a series of academic conferences in the mid-2000s on rethinking social democracy. This important volume is now ripe for reassessment; moreover, a large number of its contributions were in the sphere of economic policy. The book also offers a social democratic follow-up to the influential edited collection on Thatcherism by Jackson and Saunders (2012).

If the book seeks to attend to the large canvas of social democracy, it also pursues breadth in terms of its ideological inclusivity and its contributors. The term ‘social democracy’ serves as the unifying concept for the book, reflecting that in most major European countries, and certainly in Britain, the main social democratic political party has long been the primary focus of academic analysis, and broader public debate about the achievements and shortcomings of ‘progressive’ ideas – and indeed social progress as a whole. However, ‘social democracy’ is intended as a relatively expansive umbrella term, and it is one of the guiding assumptions that progressive ideas do not reside exclusively in any one ideology or party. Contributors (and themes) in the book range from socialists through social democrats to liberals, and, indeed, there is an acknowledgement in some of the discussion that conservatism has incorporated progressive dynamics. There is much divergence of viewpoint, reflecting the intellectual diversity of progressivism, past and present, as a whole. Although many of the chapters are written by academics and public intellectuals, several contributors hail from think tanks, journalism and government. In these respects, the book seeks to mirror its honorand, who has always bridged life’s disciplinary, occupational and ideological divides. This is not to dispense, though, with an over-arching narrative, and a concern with the fluctuating mix of advances and retreats in progressive politics, and its essential ideas related to democratic empowerment and social equality permeates all the chapters. David Marquand’s political approach and ideas provide
the starting-point for many of the contributions. Equally, all the chapters open up fresh lines of enquiry of their own.

Progressive dilemmas: the historical long view

Part I takes the historical bird’s eye view, exploring social democratic and liberal dilemmas that both pervaded the twentieth century and remain very much alive today. Jeremy Nuttall’s chapter examines the many-sided relationship between social democracy and ‘the people’ in Britain. The issue of the people, the citizenry, the voters has long been a perplexing one for social democrats. Standing up for ordinary people is the very purpose of social democracy, and yet the people have frequently seemed to social democrats something of a disappointment, alternately insufficiently engaged with politics, or too conservative or individualistic when they do engage. Whilst highlighting this as a challenge and a problem, Chapter 2 also suggests that scholars and political analysts tend to under-play the extent to which progressivism and the voters have managed to operate in constructive harmony in the past, and the potential in the present moment for them to do so again.

For all the contemporary allure of populism, the British people have been, and are, on the whole, better than some of the worst sentiments aroused by the ‘Brexit’ project indicate, and their better instincts are open to more forward-looking political agendas. The chapter also contends, however, that channelling this more progressive side of the people will require social democrats to raise their game, too. If the people have sometimes disappointed social democrats, social democracy has also often failed properly to serve the people, tending, in its class outlooks, conservatism and internal obsessions, to itself lag behind some of the growing yearning for modernity, opportunity and affluence of the society it is claiming to wish to change. Both the people as a whole, then, and social democracy as an ideology, need to re-acquaint with, and refresh, the more forward-looking, constructive, optimistic sides of their respective natures.

A crucial part of this process will be intellectual and ideological re-thinking and reinvigoration, and more specifically an attention to the enduring intellectual and political divisions within progressivism. In Chapter 3, Michael Freeden probes this divide within liberalism whilst also addressing its implications for social democracy. Tracing liberalism’s, and especially New and social liberalism’s, distinctive offer of a fusion between social interdependence and individualism, Freeden assesses the failure of this liberalism to become the over-arching driver
of twentieth-century politics. Too often, liberalism remained divided between its two wings, and insufficiently intellectually bold and imaginative in building on the ideological syntheses that Leonard Hobhouse, in particular, had articulated in the early part of the century. Such visions had been unable fully to break through amid alternative, more technocratic conceptions of the state, or adulations of the market, as well as the sheer magnitude of the challenges of the historical day to day. Nonetheless, Freeden sees two grounds for optimism. One is that liberalism has enjoyed a greater, albeit somewhat covert, influence than the rather limited later twentieth-century electoral success of the Liberal Party implies. In particular, liberalism long infused social democracy, notably in its Croslandite and New Labour variants. Second, the resilience and durability of liberalism, for all its apparent minority status, has been under-estimated, and it may well prove its fortitude at this contemporary populist moment, just as it appears under such strain and attack.

A third set of historical progressive dilemmas is explored, in Chapter 4, by Andrew Gamble through a re-visiting of Marquand’s 1977 biography of Ramsay MacDonald. An extensive historical work, which sought to rescue MacDonald from the simplistic cries from his own party of betrayal for his heading of the coalition National Government in 1931, the book was also intended to offer clear lessons for what Marquand viewed as a Labour Party in the 1970s undermining itself though its class warfare, trade union sectionalism and doctrinal narrowness. Gamble argues that the dilemmas observed and lived out by both MacDonald and by Marquand, as his biographer, endured throughout the twentieth century and, indeed, remain unresolved today. How could the Labour Party protect the labour interest, yet also resonate beyond it, to a middle class and national audience? To what extent could it retain high ideals whilst also not shirking the practical responsibilities of actual government and the pursuit of electoral success? The answers to these questions, Gamble notes, divided left and right in the party. Yet, in other ways, they also united intellectuals of left and right in their frustration with the perceived conservatism, and intellectual inertia of the party’s ‘pragmatic’ tradition. In today’s context, then, there is the challenge of how to reconcile Corbynism with Blairism, yet also of how to reconcile the metropolitan liberalism which these present and past leaders have in common with some of the discontents of the party’s northern working-class heartlands. Nearly one hundred years on, MacDonald offers, if not outright answers, some insights into the way in which, in times arguably even more challenging than our own – as the infant Labour Party sought to solidify its very existence – he grappled for an extended period with these delicate political balancing acts.
Forever a rolling stone: the life and endeavours of David Marquand

Before introducing some of the more contemporary dilemmas examined in the book's later chapters, we pause here to reflect on the contribution of the book's honorand. It is no contradiction to say that two of the most striking aspects of David Marquand's intellectual contribution are its breadth and its depth. In terms of the former, it is that ability to cross life's spheres, to combine and synthesise intellectual and political schools, that most impresses. He has been a politician and a thinker, a historian and a political theorist, a contributor to both left and centrist ideological traditions and, latterly, and increasingly, engaged with issues of democratic republicanism, civic engagement, identity and social history as much as the state and high policy. If it is achievement enough to excel at one thing, Marquand has been unusually successful in contributing in highly original ways to several, and perhaps most distinctively in creating something interesting from the points of intersection between them.

This breadth and variety did not, however, come at the expense of intellectual and moral depth, of unity and coherence, a sense of the big picture, the main event. He was not, as he put it of the Labour intellectual Richard Crossman, merely ‘the progressive as gadfly’, pricking intriguingly at disparate points, attacking, ‘but when the demolition was over, the site was left vacant’ (Marquand, 1992: 137–8). Marquand has always sought to address the large canvas, to search for the crux of things. What was most at the crux of things was the importance of values. His progressivism was determinedly, in Peter Clarke’s distinction, ‘moral’, not ‘mechanical’.

Although Marquand has attained considerable laudation and standing, the extent of his contribution remains somewhat under-estimated. This reflects that, lacking the perspective of hindsight, we tend to under-value the achievement of that which is closest to us in time, and Marquand’s major works, most of which were published well into his 40s and beyond, remain relatively recent. It, perhaps, also stems from his refusal to dwell in a single, easily definable political or professional home. It also indicates his own, in many ways very British sense of reserve (although he testifies in his own chapter for this volume to presently feeling less comfortable with this particular identity). In any case, Marquand should certainly be considered one of the most important of British political thinkers and public intellectuals in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

David Marquand’s ever-evolving political and intellectual life reads as a history of many of the pivotal dilemmas of British progressivism as a whole, with which
this book seeks to engage. He was born in Cardiff in 1934, son of Hilary Marquand, a professor of industrial relations and subsequently a minister in Clement Attlee’s post-war Labour government. Marquand describes his as a sort of ‘intermediate generation’, too late to fight in the Second World War, yet matured too early to be a child of the culturally dynamic 1960s (Marquand, 1997: 7). What was formative and, to the young Marquand, normalised was the statism, collectivism and welfarism of the 1940s, the character of which has been the focus of much of both his most forceful critiques and his most passionate defences. Following National Service, he arrived at Oxford in 1954, where he studied history under A. J. P. Taylor. Already a bookish sceptic, who knew that ‘revolutions devour their children’, he was nonetheless determined not to swing to the other extreme of the dry empiricism he witnessed within the dreaming spires. Here, already, was the Marquandian search for the synthesis of apparent opposites, how, he had written in a pre-university paper, ‘to find a way of applying scepticism to politics without destroying devotion’ (Marquand, 1997: 8–9).

The answer seemed to lie initially with fellow Welshman Aneurin Bevan, or the New Left, but soon he became converted to the social democratic revisionism of Tony Crosland’s *The Future of Socialism* (1956), which remained broadly his bible into the 1980s. Crosland was a fellow reconciler of values, believing a firm egalitarianism could be fused with a commitment to freedom and democracy, within a mixed democracy, given a capitalism that had been firmly tamed. This also suited the political optimism of the times, with a welfare state established, the economy booming, and globalisation and relative economic decline still some way around the corner. Marquand became a Gaitskellite *Guardian* leader-writer, and also worked briefly in academic posts at Berkeley, Oxford and Sussex.

In 1966 he became Labour MP for Ashfield, which he remained for eleven years. He would later write of his ill-suitedness to the ‘feverish inconsequence’ of parliamentary life, but it was characteristic that he was drawn to the two sides of the coin, to complement, and enhance his intellectualising about politics with practical experience of its realities (Marquand, 1997: 12). This period also witnessed the early stirrings of some of the themes that were to preoccupy him from the 1980s – how to reinvigorate British democracy, the limitations of the various British economic models of the 1960s, and the growing importance of both a political and a psychological Europeanism. He argued for devaluation with David Owen and John Mackintosh, before Harold Wilson was forced into it in 1967.

Crucially, Marquand was also one of the sixty-nine Labour MPs to rebel against a three-line whip to support new Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath’s policy of membership of the Common Market in 1971, a figure crucial
to the outweighing of the anti-European Conservative MPs who voted against. By this time, Marquand was most admiring of the leader of this rebellion, another Welshman, Roy Jenkins, who had increasingly shown himself a more skilful and serious politician than his friend and fellow leading revisionist Crosland, as well as bolder in challenging the growing dogma and conservatism of his own party in the 1970s. As Jenkins fairly recalls, ‘it was remarkable to hold sixty-nine Labour members against the pressures from constituencies, trade unions, whips, and the leadership, which all exploited the simple atavistic appeal to party loyalty and solidarity’. It reflected, ultimately, ‘the politics of principle as opposed to those of place’ (Jenkins, 1991: 311).

The problem, as Marquand now saw it, was not just that his revisionist social democratic middle way was losing ground to both a revitalised Labour left and a resurgent New Right, but that this revisionism had itself run out of intellectual steam, and now shared that outmoded over-reliance on ever-rising public expenditure and statism that also characterised Wilsonian labourist pragmatism and the Bennite left. Even the old hero Crosland had been reduced by this time, as Marquand saw it, to ‘the progressive as [party] loyalist’ (Marquand, 1992: 166). Here, was the first dramatic revelation for Marquand that the revisionism in which he had believed was not the final answer. The very mindset of questioning and fresh thinking that had given birth to revisionism now needed to be applied to its reinvention. Social democracy ‘would go on losing until revisionism had been revised’ (Marquand, 1997: 18).

Marquand resigned his seat in 1977 to work as adviser to Jenkins, now President of the European Commission, the same year as his biography of MacDonald was published. But the wide-ranging work of political thinking needed to grapple with the enduring historical dilemmas he had showcased through MacDonald had to be put on hold as he played a leading role as a founder member of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981. There are some valid criticisms of the SDP, and the Alliance it formed with the Liberal Party. Despite a striking public flirtation with its brand of less class-polarised, more centrist politics, culminating in a momentarily remarkable Gallup opinion poll rating of 51 per cent in December 1981, it fell well behind Labour’s seat share in the 1983 election, and slid steadily in support thereafter, as Labour returned gradually to moderation under Neil Kinnock (Crewe and King, 1995: 144). The somewhat socially rootless Liberal Alliance, and its leaders, over-estimated the pace of the decline of class-based party loyalties (real as it was). There is also something in the charge that the SDP, in its early years, was too much an updated version of 1950s’ Croslandism, insufficiently attuned to the more socially mobile, less deferential society of the
Making social democrats

1980s, with its yearning for home and share ownership, and self-employment, although it was certainly more attentive to these than the Labour Party. As Crewe and King (1995: 116) shrewdly observed, those in the SDP ’were founding a new party, but in many cases they were not quite sure how new they really wanted it to be’.

But, when all this is allowed for, one is more impressed by the political and intellectual insight and boldness of the SDP than its failings. In the highly polarised political and social environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s, it sought to provide a thoughtful middle way, which fused the best of both social justice and economic dynamism. Its founders were also brave – intellectually, politically and, not least, personally. Especially for those, like Marquand, who were, as he put it, ‘cradle Labour’ (Marquand, 1997: 8), it meant being willing to tear away from long-held institutional and personal loyalties and emotions. The split from Labour at this point remains perhaps the most dramatic and important instance in which Marquand exhibited, in a very direct and personal way, his commitment to the politics of independent thinking, to confronting uncomfortable new truths head on, and being willing to break with the past. In hindsight, it seems improbable that there was ever a serious chance of the Alliance ‘breaking the mould’ of two-party politics at this point, but this is because its ideas were essentially ahead of their time. They later found fruition in both the governing New Labour Party, and the resurgent new Liberal Democrat Party, in the 1990s and 2000s, the creation of which, in 1988, out of the old Alliance, Marquand was surely, in any serious view of practical party politics, correct to support.

When that next book, *The Unprincipled Society* (1988), his finest, did eventually appear, it was, therefore, the culmination of much pent-up thought, ‘two – perhaps three – books in one’, as he saw it (Marquand, 1997: 26). It critiqued the then electorally dominant neoliberalism, rejected the fading neo-socialist alternative, but crucially also pointed to the limitations of the post-war Keynesian consensus, too statist and mechanical, and lacking the moral self-definition, and self-confident philosophical defence of the virtues of the public realm to defend itself in hard times. A new, more communitarian, participatory and conversational politics of ‘mutual education’, as described earlier in this introduction, was his view of the way forward (Marquand, 1988: 246).

With the intellectual weight of *The Unprincipled Society* allied with the more politically focused *The Progressive Dilemma* (1991), both works proving that moral and ideological profundity could go hand in hand with readability and indeed, for the reader, excitement, Marquand was now at the height of direct
influence on the intellectual climate of politics. Suffering its fourth consecutive
general election defeat in 1992, Labour, under the neo-Croslandite John Smith,
and then the ultra-moderniser, Tony Blair was readier to engage with new and
challenging thinking.

The revised, 1992 edition of *The Progressive Dilemma*, updated in the light
of Labour’s election defeat, sought in Marquand’s typical fashion to deter the
party from any lazy, cosy reassurance they might derive from their modest
advance from the 1987 election. Instead, he poured directly over its face the
harsh cold-water realities of a diminishing core manual working-class base, and
accompanying growing aspirational class to whom Labour’s collectivism did not
automatically appeal (Marquand, 1992: viii). More than this, he insisted that
the party’s problems were not confined to the specifics of the 1980s. More
fundamentally, Labour had failed to fully construct the sort of broad-based,
national progressive alliance which had been achieved by the nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century Liberal Party. The reasons why included the conservatism
and group loyalty of the labourist sectional tradition, the party’s reservations
about embracing the progressive intelligentsia and new ideas, and the implausibility
of Labour’s claim to be ready for government. A new progressive coalition was
now needed, both intellectual and political, ‘social democratic in its ethic but
liberal in its practice’, inspired by values of citizenship and community, and
transcending both the old ideological categories of left, centre and right, and
the rigid existing party lines (Marquand, 1992: x).

Partly through the intellectual intermediary of David Miliband, the broad
thrust of *The Progressive Dilemma* chimed with, and influenced the early thinking
of Tony Blair and New Labour (Marquand, 2010: 42). Disagreeing with the
Liberal Democrats’ policy of equidistance from Labour and the Conservatives,
because he believed it under-valued the achievement of Neil Kinnock in reforming
his party, Marquand left the party after the 1992 election, and re-joined Labour
after Blair became leader, firmly approving the re-writing of Clause Four of the
party’s constitution, succeeding where Hugh Gaitskell had failed. For all Marquand’s
later criticisms of New Labour, he was one of its most important intellectual
influences, especially in its early, dynamically reforming years.

In high policy terms, the *zeitgeist* was in favour of combining an acceptance
of aspects of the market economy with a new emphasis on rebuilding the public
realm and public services, the sort of balance that had essentially characterised
the SDP. Marquand’s long advocacy of democratisation and constitutional reform
also found fruit in the 1997 government’s long list of modifications to the
Westminster Model, from devolution to reform of the House of Lords. Perhaps
most fundamentally, the early Blair demonstrated that Marquandian essential of sheer governing competence, finally demonstrating conclusively that one could be progressive and bold, without shedding the ability actually to manage things, and keep grasp of the detail, especially on the economy.

But there was also a new recognition in both social democratic and liberal circles that high policy was not enough. For progress to be real and sustainable, progressive values needed to have roots in, and participation from the people: the citizenry as much as the approval of the political elites. This meant social democracy must broaden its scope to incorporate an interest in culture, citizenship, community values and character, as well as to democratise political and other institutions to allow the people’s attributes to flower.

Even in his fleeting New Left days at Oxford, Marquand had been drawn by ‘their view that socialism was about culture as well as about economics’ (Marquand, 1997: 9). Later, as his enthusiasm for parliamentary and constitutional reform grew, it was qualified by the knowledge that ‘institutional changes would make little difference’ without ‘a culture of negotiation and power-sharing’ (Marquand, 1997: 13). Policies, institutions, material changes could only advance things so far. Even ideological or doctrinal refinements did not quite get to it; something still more fundamental, to do with the very attitude, approach and mentality was needed. ‘Republicanism’, Marquand was reflecting by 2010, ‘is not so much a doctrine as a cast of mind’ (Marquand, 2010: 42). All this was testimony to the relentlessly challenging and insightful quality of Marquand’s work. The eminent social historian, Arthur Marwick, in his hugely popular Penguin history of post-war Britain, labelled The Unprincipled Society ‘perhaps the most interesting political critique’ of its era (Marwick, 1990: 379).

Yet, as with any body of thought, there are criticisms and omissions in Marquandism. Lauding Marquand’s vision of a ‘principled society’ in place of the unprincipled one, Marwick observed that ‘just how this was to be achieved was less clear’ (Marwick, 1990: 379). It is a fair criticism that Marquand, for all his hard realism and historical sensitivity in some respects, at times under-estimates the real-life obstacles to the achievement of political ideals, and the constraints that practising politicians face. That leads him to under-value the ‘mixed result’ that is the outcome of so many, probably most governmental projects, certainly in modern British history. In more recent years, in particular, his appraisals of some of the more centrist post-war social democratic figures, like Crosland and Blair, appear to insufficiently allow for the circumstances of the time, or of the achievement and building blocks contained within steady, if undramatic social and political progress.
Second, while Marquand, along with Roy Jenkins, was to the fore in the 1970s in articulating a case for Labour to shed its labourist conservatism, and adapt to meet a changing society, this also, by the 1980s, had its limits. Again like Jenkins, and representative of the SDP as a whole prior to David Owen’s more forward-looking leadership, Marquand gave a nod to the way in which heightened social mobility, rising wages, home ownership and educational opportunity were empowering many formerly Labour-supporting, and now Thatcher-supporting working-class families, but it was a somewhat half-hearted one. As Black’s penetrating research has shown, socialists have long struggled to come to terms with the modernities of affluence and social change. Crucially, this did not have to mean abandoning a critique of brash materialism. But by, at times, seeming uneasy with affluence altogether, the left missed the chance to define, appropriate and shape a politics of affluence on its own terms, to the detriment of both the quality of its policy and its electoral performance (Black, 2003).

Third, if Marquand’s intellectual focus has moved increasingly beyond high politics – and his writings certainly point powerfully to the need for a very broad definition of what is political – there remains a trace in his work of the ‘mechanistic’ preoccupation with political groupings and institutions, and state machinations of which in other ways he disapproves. The interest in broader social and psychological themes, in education, mindset, character and outlook that characterises some of this book’s chapters is, thus, partly building on foundations Marquand has established, but also moving in directions he only tentatively signposted.

In 1996, Marquand became Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. This post was a fitting appointment: Mansfield is known for its democratic, egalitarian and informal culture – the scouts had the same access to the wine cellar as the dons; high table is situated no higher than the rest of the hall; the chapel points north instead of east, as in all the Anglican colleges, and as David’s wife Judith once noted with a sense of glee at a festive Mansfield event (at which Roy Jenkins spoke) commemorating Oliver Cromwell, Mansfield, had it existed in the seventeenth century, would have backed Cromwell in the Civil War, in contrast with many of the other Oxford colleges at the time.

Mansfield was also where the two editors of this volume were to enjoy the benefits of Marquand’s doctoral supervision. This was a richly rewarding, if at times somewhat daunting, experience. The high intellectual stimulation provided and the sense of being in the presence of a rapier-like mind, may be unsurprising to readers. More noteworthy, although one certainly felt one had to be at the top of one’s game, and emphatically not inadequately prepared, that feeling
coexisted with a striking degree of genuine warmth and absence of pretension, given what one might have expected in the presence of either the head of an Oxford college or a leading public intellectual, let alone both. During his years in Oxford, Marquand led path-breaking efforts, both at Mansfield and across the university, to admit higher proportions of applicants from state schools, in no small measure delivering upon the principles of equity, inclusion and pluralism he has long championed in his writings.

Upon his retirement from Mansfield in 2002, Marquand did not rest on his laurels or ride off into the sunset but immediately catapulted himself into the most prolific decade of his career, publishing four books from 2004 to 2014 and keeping a high public profile with frequent commentaries in *Prospect, New Statesman* and *The Guardian*. The first book in this more recent assemblage, *Decline of the Public*, compiles a series of essays that looked searchingly at the erosion of engaged citizenship and the attrition of the public domain in the face of neoliberalism, or ‘market fundamentalism’, as well as the more populist strands within the then-Blair government, which Marquand criticised with increasing ferocity as Blair lapsed into excessive deference to American President George W. Bush. Although *The Unprincipled Society, The Progressive Dilemma* and *Ramsay MacDonald* are often considered as Marquand’s most significant books, *Decline of the Public* has received the most academic citations, according to Google Scholar, among his many publications.

Next came *Britain Since 1918* (2008), the *magnum opus* in Marquand’s more recent writings: a comprehensive and multifaceted history of the political development and political economy of Britain that contains within it the intriguing proposition that successive British governments throughout the twentieth century shifted repeatedly across four particular conceptions of the British state: Whig imperialism, Tory nationalism, democratic collectivism and, his preferred model, ‘democratic republicanism’. Like all of Marquand’s books, the story combines lively narrative with rich interpretation that in this case was a long time in the making: Marquand shared his early prospectus of what eventually became *Britain Since 1918* with one of this volume’s editors in the spring of 1998 as he first made contact with Marquand while preparing to embark upon his studies.

Alongside his incessant writings on British history and politics, Marquand has written two noted books on European integration. First he popularised the now-common phrase ‘democratic deficit’ in *A Parliament for Europe*, published in 1979, the same year in which reforms led the way for the Parliament’s representatives to be elected directly by the citizens rather than being dispatched by the respective national assemblies of the member states. Then, in 2012, amid
the Eurozone crisis and the malaise that accompanied the palpable decline of solidarity across the member states in an overstretched European Union, Marquand published *The End of the West*, which excoriated the architects of the single European currency for forging ahead with monetary union without a corresponding fiscal union (an incongruity that the European Union has since partially corrected) and argued that the larger project of European economic and political integration can only go forward productively by pursuing a federal model. He also made the point that as the centre of gravity in the global economy shifts in the direction of Asia, Europe and the transatlantic ‘West’ must abandon its old and false sense of superiority over the ‘East’. Whilst in *Britain Since 1918*, Marquand calls for a democratic constitution for the United Kingdom, in *The End of the West* he calls for a corresponding move for the European Union. His argument encountered some criticism from those who prefer to cast the European Union as largely intergovernmental both in empirical and normative terms (Moravcsik, 2011), but the present difficulties facing the European Union leave one suspecting that Marquand’s diagnosis about the status quo was all too prescient.

Most recently, Marquand published the polemical *Mammon’s Kingdom: An Essay on Britain, Now* (2014), a blistering and blunt yet colourful and historically informed attack on the ways in which he believes today’s governing and business elites have abdicated any sense of pursuing a common good in favour of the greedy pursuit of immediate self-interest as well as crass self-gratification; indeed, Marquand uses the word ‘hedonism’. Echoing the themes of *Decline of the Public*, in terms of his worry, even despair with regard to the continued hollowing out of the public domain, *Mammon’s Kingdom* is a clarion call for market individualism and outright consumerism to be swept away once and for all into a renewed politics of the public interest and public trust. Portions of this book, in the eyes of some of the reviewers, seemed too rosy-eyed about the past, while indifferent to recent progress, both in moral and social terms, as well as new wellsprings of activism and altruism. As Rowan Williams, the former Archbishop of Canterbury and now the head of Magdalene College, Cambridge, noted in a review (Williams, 2014): ‘the irritable dismissal of late-Sixties radicalism, especially R. D. Laing and Edmund Leach, is not entirely fair: there were oppressive family structures, violent domestic arrangements and corrupt habits to be challenged, even if some of the challenges ended up generating new and equally corrupting follies’. Still, when it comes to the imperatives of renewing a social market economy, a vibrant democracy, and a morally vigorous public realm, in many respects, our ‘Making Social Democrats’ theme in this volume picks up exactly where
Marquand left off at the close of *Mammon’s Kingdom* (2014: 220), when he articulated several core values of social democracy as urgently vital at this moment in time:

We face formidable challenges, but given determination and courage we can meet them. We can break with the arid fancies of Chicagoan economics. We can begin to master markets instead of allowing them to master us. We can start to rebuild the battered public realm and halt the drift toward a market society. We can put the ethic of stewardship ahead of profit, empathetic understanding ahead of command and control, and sustainability ahead of growth …

Sceptics may wonder if such a philosophy can fly in the harsh world of the twenty-first century. The answer is straightforward. We can’t go on as we are.

David Marquand, for his part, has never found contentment in going on as he is. The eminent historian Kenneth Morgan, a contemporary of Marquand’s and one of the contributors to this volume, has noted (2014) with a mixture of irony and affection that ‘at various times, Marquand has pursued all sorts of lost or struggling causes – the SDP, the Lib Dems, proportional representation, English regionalism, Milton’s republicanism, “stakeholder society”, European federalism.’ And, most recently, Welsh nationalism and independence, in the event that his dream of a federal Britain in a federal Europe should die at the hands of Brexit. This latest cause traces back to September 2013, when David and Judith visited Cardiff, where David was born, and found themselves energised by the open, bottom-up, locally oriented democratic political culture still very much in its emerging stages. As Marquand later recounted:

Some time ago a civil servant in the devolved Welsh administration tried, in my hearing, to distil in a few words the crucial difference between the political culture of Wales and that of the United Kingdom as a whole. The overarching theme of United Kingdom governance, he said, can be summed up as ‘choice, customer, competition’. The Welsh equivalent, he thought, is ‘voice, citizen, collaboration’. Instead of endlessly looking over her shoulder at her English neighbour, the task for Wales is to make a reality of that magnificent trio. (Marquand, 2015)

Excited by this political outlook, David and Judith proceeded to buy a flat close to the oceanfront Esplanade in Penarth; so began their foray into Wales and, ultimately, their decision together in 2016 to ditch Labour and join Plaid Cymru in its efforts to bring about a renewal of democratic socialism and further devolution within the United Kingdom. Never one to rest on his laurels, David Marquand is now writing a book on the disparate histories and indeterminate prospects facing each of the four nations of the United Kingdom.
Citizenship, republicanism and democracy

Any construction of a new public philosophy and resurgence for progressive politics in the years ahead will depend on the capacities of citizens to take responsibility for the public good in multiple, overlapping communities, from local to global. Prospects for open and just societies ultimately rest in the hands of citizens, and in this sense, citizens are the glue in this collection of essays binding together mindsets and realities with regard to social democracy. Part II of this book, which concentrates on citizenship, republicanism and democracy, looks at citizenship as a set of practices carried forth by everyday people in politics and civil society – what Alexis de Tocqueville (1966: 286–7) famously termed the ‘habits of the heart’ – as well as the institutional and public policy changes that have thrown into jeopardy the entitlements and protections that necessarily accompany any meaningful social democratic citizenship.

Hans Schattle’s opening chapter for this section, Chapter 5, takes stock of these issues in a global context, particularly with regard to the breaking of the post-war-era social contract across the ‘Western’ democracies alongside the dominance, since the Reagan–Thatcher era, of neoliberalism and its tenets of deregulation, privatisation and unfettered trade. The legions of dislocated industrial workers who comprised an essential base of support for social democratic parties throughout the twentieth century have been relatively neglected by left and centre-left parties at the dawn of the twenty-first century as party leaders have shifted the balance of their strategies and public outreach toward the more affluent professional classes. As Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin have documented in their path-breaking book, Revolt on the Right, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) gained large numbers of voters from Labour’s historically white, working-class base who concluded they had been left behind by the Blair government and by New Labour. As Ford and Goodwin put it:

Symbolic and substantive commitments to helping the poor and economically insecure workers were downplayed in favour of commitments to tough spending discipline and free market reform of ‘inefficient’ state services. The needs of traditional Labour voters – for affordable housing, secure work, higher incomes and access to training – were marginalised in rhetoric and often in policy too … New Labour were seen as a party which neglected the poor and the working class, and courted minorities and the right. (2014: 129, 134)

Likewise, across the Atlantic, when Bill Clinton first campaigned for the US presidency in 1992, he pledged to restore economic opportunity for the
‘forgotten’ working classes, yet his economic policies had the effect of further widening social and economic inequalities and eroding opportunities for the working class. Schattle also reckons with the sobering reality that exclusionary variants of right-wing populism have tapped the public resentment against the excesses and inequities of economic globalisation far more effectively than a renewed model of social democracy. Indeed, the likes of Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage share with many (but certainly not all) social democrats an aversion to the same international economic institutions and arrangements. Le Pen and her National Front party have taken on board social welfare policies more commonly associated with politicians on the French left, and across the Atlantic. Although Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders articulated dramatically different visions for the United States in the 2016 presidential campaign, they drew supporters from the same wellspring of economic frustration – the still-forgotten voters shunted into the margins by every American president since the waning days of the Cold War.

How, then, can social democratic citizenship be transformed for the new technologically driven, digitally interconnected world of the twenty-first century? Schattle argues that empowerment, equity and engagement are three lodestars for the re-making of social democratic citizenship and illustrates how new voices and venues are emerging in pursuit of more auspiciously deployed governing institutions and public policies. It isn’t enough for today’s social democrats merely to follow the directives of party leaders or trade union bosses. In fact, this isn’t even on the cards, since many of today’s voters who lean toward a social democratic ideology belong neither to a trade union nor to a political party. Yet new local, transnational and virtual venues – from online petitions to social movement campaigns that confront local problems using global platforms – have great potential in filling the vacuum and creating new public spaces for deliberation and contestation. Indeed, this is the most promising way to tap into righteous anger over economic injustice while preventing it from simmering into the toxic, xenophobic brew fuelling much (but again, not all) of today’s ‘new’ populism. Schattle emphasises that although today’s social democrats inevitably operate in capitalist frameworks, there are indeed real divides in interests between labour and capital: the business sector, by its nature, has never sought to take on benevolence, and social democrats must take up the challenge of modulating, managing and regulating capitalist economies in ways that protect the interests and uphold the well-being of the general public; this imperative of social democracy is timeless.

Stuart White shifts the critical scrutiny, in Chapter 6, to the extensive body of thought from David Marquand on citizenship, and especially Marquand’s
civic republican vision for a far more energised and engaged public in Britain. Taking stock of how Marquand’s thinking about citizenship in relation to governing institutions has evolved throughout the past three decades, he shows how Marquand’s preferred democratic republicanism, as set forth especially in Britain Since 1918, elevates civic virtue as not only instrumental toward the pursuit of social and economic justice but also as an end in itself in political life. At the nexus of citizenship and democracy, in Marquand’s thinking, is public deliberation in the search for a common good as well as the public embrace of duties alongside rights. All this ties into Marquand’s close affinities, especially in his writings published in the years preceding New Labour’s 1997 election, with ‘communitarian’ critics, such as Alasdair MacIntyre (1980) and Michael Sandel (1996), of an excessively individualistic and atomistic model of liberalism. Marquand decisively positions himself against both market individualism and moral individualism as impediments to establishing a shared public philosophy with a common public purpose.

Echoing the language of J. G. A. Pocock, the path-breaking historian of the civic republican tradition who wrote of the ‘Machiavellian moment’ (1975), White argues that the beleaguered United Kingdom is ripe for a ‘Marquandian moment’ that would help usher in a new configuration of governing institutions, along the lines of federalism and pluralism, thereby living up to civic republican principles far more readily than the existing, highly centralised, ‘winner-take-all’ British state. White cautions, however, that civic republican processes of public deliberation and responsive decision-making do not necessarily yield social democratic outcomes. Civic republicans can just as easily lean toward conservatism or a radically individualistic brand of liberalism. In light of this, White maintains that today’s social democrats need to focus on rendering state institutions more accessible and accountable to the myriad interests of the public, and that the English, in particular, need to cultivate a civic nationalism that will enable England’s increasingly diverse population to shape a newly unifying, socially inclusive political narrative.

For all the emphasis in this volume upon the practices and accompanying mindsets of citizenship, state institutions and their respective configurations also matter decisively in determining whether or not social democratic agendas go forward in government decisions and policies. Many chapters, therefore, place great weight upon possible ways to reshape governing institutions in Britain in ways that would point toward Marquand’s conception of democratic republicanism and better serve the public: towards more federal, plural, decentralised arrangements that spur public participation and account more fully for the
interests and problems facing a diverse and stratified, even fractured population. Other questions that take a high profile in this section include the extent to which it is feasible for capitalism and democracy to operate in mutual harmony, and what it will take for the political left in Britain to regroup, regain power and, eventually, govern more effectively than before, in whatever institutional arrangements it might inherit.

Ben Jackson is preoccupied, in Chapter 7, with possible changes in the configuration of the United Kingdom: he confronts head-on the looming possibility of Scottish secession from the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. Jackson sees this development as a long time in coming and critiques the thinkers behind Charter 88 for giving the Scottish question ‘short shrift’ in their landmark document on constitutional reform. Although the spectre of secession might sound ominous, Jackson points out that Scottish nationalism has evolved in a way highly compatible with the imperatives of republican social democracy, and that somewhat ironically, Scottish independence from the United Kingdom could have the effect of finally shifting England into more pluralist and republican forms of governance; it could also prompt England, he argues, to forge a stronger link between democratic reform and economic reform that Marquand has long advocated in his writings. Jackson takes seriously the Scottish nationalist critique that the United Kingdom, as it currently exists, is ‘unreformable’, and he sees the Scottish nationalists as the furthest along, of all the political parties in Britain, on the path to a democratic-pluralist vision of governance.

The principled society: mindsets and values

Part III seeks to apply Marquand’s search for the ‘principled society’, and his favouring of a moral over a mechanical politics to some crucial contemporary, as well as broad historical contexts. It also takes Marquand as a starting-point for some new departures, in particular his previously mentioned reflection that the route to political advancement, or democratic republicanism lay not so much in ‘a doctrine as a cast of mind’ (Marquand, 2010: 42). The importance of mindset in politics, and of psychological attributes of outlook or good character, whether their presence or absence, to the success, or failure, of political projects has begun to receive attention in recent years, especially from modern British historians. In his seminal work on nineteenth-century ‘public moralists’, Stefan Collini pointed to the prominence of the ideal of character in Victorian thought (Collini, 1991: 94). Collini adjudged this less central to twentieth-century thinking,
but in fact political thought, on the left, right and centre has remained very interested in the question of the virtue and character of the citizenry, and of politics as values and outlook, not simply ideas and policies. The Labour Party’s historical approach to the theme of character was explored in Nuttall’s work on *Psychological Socialism* (Nuttall, 2006), and the relevance of character and outlook to contemporary politics is touched on in several chapters beyond this section, including Nuttall’s own.

In Chapter 8, Clare Griffiths probes the historical and political implications of the social and psychological concept of ‘neighbourliness’, especially as it played out in that pivotal moment of apparent social democratic ascendancy, the 1940s, and the ‘People’s War’. In line with the revisionist historiography on this period, Griffiths warns us against romanticising the decade, and exaggerating the degree of good will and community spirit that really existed. ‘Neighbourliness’ was often constructed, whether to boost the case for the war effort or, later, for socialism or town planning. It could also at times be invasive and snooping. Yet, she insists, we should not ignore the importance of the aspiration to neighbourliness, albeit imperfect and half-formed, as it was a persistent theme at government and intellectual levels, but also in ordinary, everyday conversations. Part-hidden in the seemingly more statist 1960s and 1970s, it has nevertheless re-emerged in the contemporary political era. Above all, it shows the important relationship between values and emotions on the one hand and political objectives on the other, as well as subjects like housing policy and community life somewhere in between. ‘The idea of neighbourliness’, notes Griffiths, ‘opened up a different political territory, between the private sphere of the home and the public sector of government’.

Gideon Calder’s intersecting themes of political contestation, care and the temper of the country examine the public good less as a fixed entity but rather as an evolving conversation taking place across a wide range of social settings, not least in the flux and informality of everyday life. Drawing on Marquand’s belief that progressivism was as much about process as outcomes, Calder suggests that it is also not just about doctrine, but also, as R. H. Tawney articulated, dependent on a certain ‘temper’ in the country at large. Progress required not just structural or economic change, but good relationships, not just the espousal of social democracy, but the making of social democrats. Consequently, Calder concludes his chapter with ten suggestions for progress not via policy, but through conversation. One is to converse as if listening were as valued an attribute as speaking; another is not to speak as if the status quo tightly defines all available horizons.
Sharing Calder’s view that social democracy must be lived and practised as a never-ending quest for improvement, Neal Lawson, in Chapter 10, probes the historical reasons why the ethically driven, pluralist politics espoused by Marquand has yet to be fully adopted and assesses its relevance to the present. For much of the twentieth century, he argues, a mechanistic politics (and economics) were variously reflected in the power of, and importance attached to the state, the big company, the political ‘centre’, hierarchy and the machine. Fordism and Fabianism went hand in hand, but in the early twenty-first century they have given way to an uncertain situation in which capitalism is discredited, yet social democracy has not worked out a persuasive alternative. The need, in Lawson’s eyes, is to bend modernity to social democratic values, neither ignoring modernity, like Jeremy Corbyn, nor bending the values to modernity, as with Tony Blair. The less hierarchical, more communicationally and informationally connected modern society offers grounds for optimism about the prospects for more democratic and egalitarian approaches. However, this must entail making moral choices, in favour of Marquand’s vision of active citizenship over turbo-consumerism. In terms of political means, it also entailed a more pluralist and decentralised politics, and the creation of a progressive, cross-party alliance.

In the final chapter of Part III, Kenneth Morgan explores the significance of Christopher Addison, a still relatively neglected figure, whose long career illuminates many of the central dilemmas of the broad progressive tradition in the first half of the twentieth century, as well as offering some lessons for Labour’s faction-ridden army today. Unusual in being a Lloyd George coalition Liberal who crossed over to Labour and not the Conservatives, Addison symbolises that there was, in his case and others, a fusion of the socialist and liberal progressive traditions, even if it did not lead to a merger of the parties. Addison was very much a practical social democrat, ‘mechanical’ in some ways, Morgan suggests, from work with local authorities, through the cooperative movement, to collaboration with the professions over national insurance. Yet he was driven by a clear moral purpose. This was an illustration that mechanical and moral routes to progress could be complementary, and that, as Morgan notes, an excessively abstract or pious moralism (as with some Victorian moralists) was of little benefit without a substantial practical agenda to give it concrete thrust. A further lesson for social democrats today is that Addison was far removed from a grandstander, drawn to conflict for its own sake. He pursued ideals, but was also grounded in the possibilities of the moment. As Morgan concludes, ‘a quiet medical man of the Edwardian centre-left could be re-emerging as a prophet of practical socialism in our time, dreaming his dreams but always basing them on existing realities’.
Whither social democracy in Britain? Prospects, reflections and realities

Academic history and political theory at times show too little understanding of practical political constraints and realities, just as practitioners can lose sight of vision and the broader horizons. Any project on reinvigorating social democracy must therefore reckon with the practical hurdles, pitfalls and obstacles that inevitably accompany and, at times, inhibit or foreclose public policy innovations and reforms in the configurations and objectives of political institutions. It is equally essential to come to terms with the very rough and tumble of political bargaining and partisan jockeying in the corridors of government and beyond. Hence the chapters in Part IV combine scholarly insights with more practical sources of wisdom culled from the analysis of everyday politics – akin to Harold Lasswell’s immortal take on politics as ‘who gets what, when, how’ (1936) – as well as decades of hands-on, lived experiences across the arenas of politics and government, business, civil society and academia.

The hands-on challenges involved in building up genuinely democratic mechanisms of self-government in Britain take a high profile in Tony Wright’s essay (Chapter 12) focused on the democracy aspects within social democracy. In Wright’s view, today’s social democrats must probe the depths of this fundamental question: what kind of state is important and for what purpose? Mediating public interests and private interests is cast in this chapter as a central task of social democracy, along with checking corporate power for the good of the public. Like it or not, Wright notes, the Brexit referendum was a remarkably successful democratic uprising, regardless of whether leaving the European Union is truly in the long-term interest of Britain and its citizenry. The defeat for the ‘Remain’ campaign underscored the weaknesses of the Labour Party in the ‘politics of place and identity’, and renewed the imperative for social democrats to defend the liberal tradition in the face of nationalist and populist attacks.

Social democracy is no longer (if it ever was) the route to a resolutely socialist future but rather to democratic outcomes that fulfil the needs of the general public in liberal democratic political systems. Achieving this goal in Britain is a challenge, Wright says, not only because of the government’s ‘centralised and concentrated’ power but also because any real sense of active citizenship across the United Kingdom continues to languish in a state of underdevelopment. Yet despite all the setbacks that have undermined social democracy throughout the past generation, its ‘permanent revisionism’ is needed more than ever, Wright says, as the continuous restructuring of the economy in the hypercompetitive global marketplaces breeds tremendous insecurity for all segments of workers
– professionals as well as the working class. Wright also notes that for all the problems, social democrats can take pride in the hard-fought public goods won through the years – better jobs, cleaner air, affordable health care – and forge ahead for a wholesale democratic revolution in Britain that renders a government more ‘decentralised, pluralised and participatory’. As Wright aptly puts it, ‘If democracy is about enabling people to exercise some power and control over the forces that impact on their lives, then social democrats should be those who are constantly looking for ways to make this a reality.’

David Owen, in Chapter 13, reflects upon the underlying concerns that he and David Marquand share in principle: creating conditions to foster a more equitable distribution of wealth and resources in Britain, as well as a bottom-up, republican social democracy championing the virtues of justice and equality. Despite their incompatible positions on Europe, with Marquand supporting a federal Britain embedded in a federal Europe and Owen having campaigned for Brexit, the two erstwhile parliamentary colleagues converge in placing priority, in tandem, on democratic empowerment and economic reform and see these two goals as thoroughly interconnected. Can Britain manage to hang together in a post-Brexit Europe and also shift to a republican civic culture? Owen sees this prospect as still within reach, despite the obstacles.

David Marquand, in Chapter 14, revisits the trajectory of his thinking and writing across his varied life experiences – as a history student tutored by A. J. P. Taylor, journalist at the Guardian, parliamentarian, European Union official, Oxford don, public intellectual and, most recently, Welsh nationalist, as a convert to Plaid Cymru as of 2016. Among the revelations here is that Marquand places such a high priority on transforming Britain into a more robustly democratic and civic culture that he turned down the ‘half-offer’ of a peerage some years ago, noting that ‘I couldn’t have lived with myself if I had accepted.’ He also traces his pro-European leanings back to his period of national service in the RAF, contrasting the fates of his Russian language teachers who had been displaced from their homes and their career paths with his own fortunate circumstances:

I couldn’t help realising that, but for the lucky chance of a few miles of salt water, their fates might have been mine. As a result, I came to feel that the smug, condescending and self-righteous notion that Britain was different from and better than the rest of the European continent was both false and disgraceful. The seeds of my lifelong commitment to the vision of a united Europe were sown in the unlikely setting of a camp of leaky wooden huts perched on the edge of Bodmin moor.
Above all, Marquand places value on the ‘mutual learning’ that goes with pluralist democracy as well as the potential, through public deliberation, for citizens to transform their outlook, perspectives and maybe even their very natures as human beings by taking on board the perspectives of others that they encounter in political conversation, even in the most informal of settings. This is what worries Marquand most about populism: that populism of any kind has the effect of extinguishing the potential for dynamic political education, mutual respect, public empowerment and moral advancement. It is also why Marquand, in his chapter, issues a ringing endorsement of pluralist democracy and a sharp denunciation of populism in which its leaders, or, in many cases, demagogues, falsely claim to speak ‘for the people’, when they are merely speaking to the people, while also fraudulently framing the people as a ‘homogenous and monolithic whole’.

Mindful of Britain’s uncertain prospects – both as a member state of the European Union and as an intact United Kingdom – Marquand concludes by observing that the outlying nations of the United Kingdom are now far more poised for this kind of pluralist democracy than the prevailing sentiment across most of England. Should Brexit actually go forward, Marquand writes, then ‘I would want Wales to become an independent nation state within a proto-federal European Union instead of being chained for ever to a hard-right, chauvinistic and xenophobic England’. Can a reinvigorated, pluralist, republican social democracy emerge in a still-United Kingdom no longer part of the European Union? Marquand has all but given up on this possibility, and in doing so he is sounding the alarm bell for progressives in general and the Labour Party in particular.

Will Hutton, in Chapter 15, levels indictments against the existing British state and its elected dictatorship as a ‘Gothic, feudal horror’ as well as the political left for lapsing into a state of ‘bankruptcy’ under current Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn. (His attack on Corbyn is reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson’s charges against King George III as written in the US Declaration of Independence.) In contrast, despite all the malefeasance documented within the business sector in the years surrounding the 2008–9 financial crisis – a global cataclysm that discredited ‘market fundamentalism’ even as this ideology remains largely dominant in the present day – Hutton adopts a far softer tone on the business sector and maintains that harmony between vigorous capitalism and reinvigorated self-government is entirely within reach.

Government leaders, in Hutton’s view, ought to engage business, broadly speaking, in positive terms as a public institution with the purpose of placing
‘human betterment’ over profit, and accordingly, he suggests that the role of government is to orchestrate a harmonious relationship between democracy and capitalism: he is seeking a capitalistic rendition of social democracy, not a socialist version. On the other hand, Hutton acknowledges that the post-war social contract has been ‘unpicked’ in the course of the past generation and worries that the existing political and economic system in Britain – and especially the way the system tilts toward Tory governments that perpetuate injustices not even supported by the majority of the public – inhibits (at best) and perhaps even forecloses the possibility of reform. Hence, Hutton concludes by claiming that successful democracy and successful capitalism both require a massive shift in political power in the United Kingdom away from top-down centralisation and domination – which Hutton specifically cautions Labour to avoid, not embrace, whenever it regains power – and toward bottom-up participation and wealth generation. All told, Britain’s social democrats face the immediate challenge of crafting a new set of guiding principles and compelling programmes that will help the left (including the centre-left) regain power and inspire the entire country across its many lines of asymmetry and diversity.

Taking stock of citizens, mindsets, realities

The overarching theme of this book, Making Social Democrats, brings together the intersecting notions of citizens, mindsets and realities. How do these three keywords relate with the ongoing challenge of reviving and reshaping progressive politics?

Citizenship, of course, is one of the central political concepts, an idea that partisans across the ideological spectrum in any democracy claim to champion even as they disagree on its essence. As many thinkers, including David Marquand, have long noted, citizenship encompasses multiple duos: rights and responsibilities, status and practices, membership and participation. Liberals and social democrats often place priority on rights, entitlements and protections, with a strong role for governing institutions in securing public goods and implementing social welfare provisions, whilst conservatives tend to give more weight to the marketplace and civil society as well as the good character of individual human persons. It is our premise in this book, though, that the state–society divide offers nothing more than a false and unhappy choice: meaningful democratic citizenship of any kind necessarily transcends the realms of state and society. It is not enough for social democrats merely to implement public policies defending the interests of the middle classes and working classes without cultivating the qualities of
actively engaged and responsibly empowered citizens. Likewise, it is folly to offload the responsibility for maintaining social welfare primarily to the citizenry while rolling back the involvement of the state in safeguarding social and economic rights. Ultimately, in free societies, we citizens get the government we seek, regardless of whether the resulting collective of leaders and their decisions yield us the government we deserve. This is why citizenship and democracy worth having depend so heavily on the actions, judgements and indeed the prevailing spirit of the citizenry.

The notion of mindsets spins off, in many respects, from the concept of citizenship, since mindsets – as in dispositions, perspectives and outlooks – constitute a vital element of citizenship. Citizenship encompasses ways of thinking as well as ways of living, and this has been widely recognised by political and social theorists. As T. H. Marshall (1963: 8) famously noted, citizenship, at least in the national sense, depends on ‘a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession’. What kind of mindset might take precedence among the citizenry at any given moment therefore becomes a crucial question: mindsets can be either narrow or broad; inclusive or exclusive; short-sighted or far-reaching; ignorant or enlightened. Mindsets can either privilege or downgrade various constellations of liberty, equality and democracy; mindsets can also have the effect of justifying either engagement and activism or apathy and indifference. Because mindsets amount to far more than the composite pulse of the citizenry at any given time, translating into imperatives for governing institutions and their resulting policy choices, mindsets hold fundamental importance in shaping the destinies of political communities at all levels.

In some ways, ‘realities’ might come across as banal and disheartening as a subtitle – as nothing more than a series of hard knocks to undercut whatever lofty mindsets might fortuitously spring forth from the public – but it requires only passing reflection to realise the extent that political realities are anything but preordained. To be sure, as shown in the chapters that follow, some of today’s realities are challenging for social democrats: several authors relay incidence upon incidence of dislocation and disempowerment of unjustifiably marginalised segments of the public. Many of today’s biggest problems lie well beyond the capacities of individual states to solve on their own, yet also elude the necessary global coordination: the endurance of neoliberalism in spite of its failures, the intensification of global warming, the spread of suicide terrorism and the accompanying chill this places upon civil liberties, resurgent militarism and nuclear proliferation in an emerging and potentially unstable multipolar world, the persistence of sexism, racism and discrimination against cultural minorities, to name a few. Such realities impose new challenges on all political leaders, not
only social democrats, while also rendering the principles of social democracy all the more necessary.

And yet although today’s problems are daunting, the present stockpile of realities is far from uniformly bleak; as also noted by several authors in this volume, all of us can take solace in the many ways in which social progress has taken hold over the past generation on many fronts: advances in the rights of women, children, ethnic and sexual minorities, as well as persons with disabilities; greatly improved access to higher education; higher quality and more accessible health care; longer life expectancies thanks to improved nutrition and heightened scientific knowledge and medical capacity; and greater comfort, convenience and choice in many facets of everyday life. As economist Branko Milanović (2012) is fond of pointing out in his expositions on inequality, societies were far more equal when almost everyone lived barely above subsistence level. Lastly, we can also think about realities in an aspirational sense: what unacceptable realities must today’s social democrats confront most forcefully and, correspondingly, what kinds of new realities should progressives strive to bring into existence? We hope the essays in this volume cast light upon such questions and help point the way toward a renaissance for social democratic politics.

References
